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DISPOSITIONS OF PROPERTY TO UNINCORPORATED 
NON-PROFIT ASSOCIATIONSt 
Harold A. ]. Ford* 
B. Construction of Disposition as One to the 
Purposes of the Association 
IT now becomes necessary to examine the cases in which the dis-position could not be treated as one to the existing members. 
This treatment will disclose that some courts have been pre-
pared to regard some dispositions to associations as being for the 
purposes of the association. The only way in which property 
may be devoted to a purpose without conferring beneficial in-
terests on particular individuals is by a trust. Accordingly in 
many instances the disposition takes effect as a trust. 
I. Distinction Between Pure Purpose Trusts and Trusts for 
the Purposes of Associations. At this point reference should. be 
made to the controversy66 concerning non-charitable purpose trusts 
which stems from the supposed doctrine that for a trust to exist 
there must be some person in whose favor a court can decree per-
formance of the trust. 
The proponents of the view that non-charitable purpose trusts 
are void because they lack this requirement rely on the words of 
Sir William Grant, M.R., in Morice v. Bishop of Durham61 when 
he said, 
"There can be no trust, over the exercise of which this 
Court will not assume a control; for an uncontrollable power 
of disposition would be ownership, and not trust. If there be 
a clear trust, but for uncertain objects, the property, that is 
the subject of the trust, is undisposed of, and the benefit of 
such trust must result to those, to whom the law gives the 
t The first instalment of this article was published in the November 1956 issue (55 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 67).-Ed. 
• Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Melbourne; LL.B. 1948, LL.M. 1949, Univer-
sity of Melbourne.-Ed. 
66 Hart, "Some Reflections on Re Chardon," 53 L. Q. R.Ev. 24 at 29-35 (1937); 
Eggleston, "Purpose Trusts," 2 R.Es JuDICATAE 118 (1940); Marshall, "The Failure of the 
Astor Trust," 6 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 151 (1953); Sheridan, "Trusts for Non-Charitable 
Purposes,'' 17 CoNVEY. 46 (1953); Gray, "Gifts for a Non-Charitable Purpose,'' 15 HARv. 
L. R.Ev. 389 (1892); Ames, "The Failure of the Tilden Trust," 5 HARV. L. R.Ev. 389 
(1892); Clark, "Unenforceable Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 10 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
31 (1911); Smith, "Honorary Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 30 CoL. L. R.Ev. 
60 (1930); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§119-124 (1939); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th 
ed., Appx. H (1942); Scott, "Trusts for Charitable and Benevolent Purposes," 58 HARv. 
L. REv. 548 (1945). 
67 9 Ves. Jr. 399 at 404-405, 32 Eng. Rep. 656 (1804). 
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ownership in default of disposition by the former owner. 
But this doctrine does not hold good with regard to trusts for 
charity. Every other trust must have a definite object. There 
must be somebody, in whose favour the Court can decree 
performance." 
Whatever cogency their argument may have in relation to 
trusts for the maintenance of animals, for the upkeep of monu-
ments, private museums and the like, it can have no application 
to trusts for the purposes of non-charitable associations. Professor 
Gray, in the third edition of his work on the rul~ against perpetui-
ties, thought that trusts of the latter kind would be invalid because 
there would be no legal person who would be benefi.ciary.68 But 
even on the strictest interpretation of Morice v. Bishop of Durham 
all that is required is that there should be somebody in whose 
favor the court can decree performance of the trust. This require-
ment is met in the case of trusts for the purposes of non-charitable 
associations. It is well established that any member can ask the 
court to enforce devotion of the association's property in accord-
ance with the constitution of the association.69 
That he is not suing to protect a severable property interest of 
his own as substantial as that which he might have if he were 
simply one of a number of joint tenants or tenants in common is 
made apparent by the cases defining his rights in the association 
property.70 Even when the property concerned in such a suit has 
not been received under an express trust for the association's pur-
poses, the individual interest of each member is slight.11 When 
68 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §§894-909a (1915). 
69 Fells v. Read, 3 Ves. Jr. 70, 30 Eng. Rep. 899 (1796); Re St. James' Club, 2 De 
G. M. &: G. 383, 42 Eng. Rep. 920 (1852); Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. D. 482 (1880); Huegli 
v. Pauli, 26 Ont. L.R. 94, 4 D.L.R. 319 (1912); Langville v. Nass, 51 N.S.R. 429, 36 D.L.R. 368 
(1917); McGuire v. Evans, 19 Ont. W.N. 174 (1920); Kowalchuk v. Ukrainian Labor Farmer 
Temple Assn., [1935] 1 W.W.R. 529, 43 Man. R. 76, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 691; Van Kerk-
voorde v. Moroney, 23 C.L.R. 426 at 433, 23 Arg. L.R. 408 (1917); Stevens v. Keogh, 72 
C.L.R. 1 (1946); Ludlam v. Higbee, 11 N.J. Eq. 342 (1857); Liggett v. Ladd, 17 Ore. 89, 
21 P. 133 (1888); White v. Rice, 112 Mich. 403, 70 N.W. 1024 (1897); Davis v. Hudgins, 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 225 S.W. 73; Oster v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and 
Enginemen, 271 Pa. 419, 114 A. 377 (1921); Carson v. Gikas, 321 Mass. 468, 73 N.E. (2d) 
893 (1947). 
70 Pages 73-75, supra [55 MICH. L. R.Ev. 67 (1956)). 
71 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (records and papers of unincorporated 
trade union not the private records of the individual members or officers of the organi-
zation. A member cannot refuse to produce them in judicial proceedings on the ground 
that they might tend to incriminate him. They embody no element of personal privacy 
and carry with them no claim of personal privilege which enures to his benefit under the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States); Appeal of Coy, 126 Me. 256, 
137 A. 771 (1927) (member of an unincorporated club organized for social purposes has 
no such pecuniary interest in a bequest to a trustee upon trust to pay income to the 
club as to make him incompetent to witness the will containing the bequest. The possi-
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he sues he seeks to protect not only his slight interest but also the 
beneficial interest of the group enterprise. It is as if he were suing 
on behalf of the association's purpose as well as himself. It is the 
identification of the individual by reason of his membership with 
the purposes of the association which answers Professor Gray's 
objection. In the following treatment, the non-charitable purpose 
trust, of which those for the maintenance of monuments are ex-
. amples, will be referred to as a "pure purpose trust" to distinguish 
it from a trust for the purposes of an association. 
2. The Impact of Rules Aimed at Forwarding the Circula-
tion of Property Which May Be Relevant to Pure Purpose Trusts 
and Trusts for the Purposes of Associations. Most of the cases 
in which the disposition to an association could not be read as a 
disposition to the existing members have involved debate as to 
whether the disposition had the effect of restricting the circula-
tion of property to such an extent that it should not be upheld. 
In some of these cases, authorities concerned with the extent of 
such restriction permissible in pure purpose trusts have been 
considered relevant. Accordingly it is necessary to sketch in the 
background of law against which those questions have been con-
sidered. 
The policy of the common law has been to promote the circu-
lation of property. Various doctrines implement this policy. 
There is one body of law concerned with ensuring that when 
an interest in property is given, it shall not be accompanied by 
restraints which would substantially deprive the grantee of the 
power of alienating that interest. There are exceptions in the 
form of grants· of leasehold interests and, in a majority of jurisdic-
tions in the United States, settlements, devises and bequests in 
the form of valid spendthrift trusts. 72 Another exception which 
was formerly important was the settlement, devise or bequest of 
property to the separate use of a married woman. Apart from 
these exceptions, any attempt to create a legal or equitable interest 
in a person in such a way that that person should enjoy the prop-
erty and its fruits and yet be unable to alienate his interest could 
bility that that member with other members will enjoy greater club comforts by reason 
of the bequest does not make it a pecuniary benefit to him. The chances that the witness 
may benefit from a reduction of the club dues, that he may be saved from liability for 
club debts, that he may receive a share of the accrued income upon the dissolution of 
the club are so remote, uncertain and contingent that they have no present pecuniary 
value). See annotation, 53 A.L.R. 211 (1927), in which other cases on the same point 
are collected. 
"12 As to spendthrift trusts, see GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed. (1947); 1 Scorr, 
'TRUSTS §§149-162 (1939); TRUSTS RE.sTATEMENT §§149-162 (1935). 
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not take effect as intended.73 The underlying policy was made 
effective by allowing the disposition to take effect free of the at-
tempted restraint. 
There is another body of law collected under the rubric, Rule 
against Perpetuities, which is not aimed at direct attempts to. 
restrain the alienation of present interests but at attempts to create 
remote future interests which would indirectly restrain the alien-
ation of property. It is concerned with the situation where the 
enjoyment of either the whole quantum of interest in particular 
property or any part thereof is in abeyance pending the ascertain-
ment of the persons who are to have that interest and the ascertain-
ment of the quantum of interest of each. Under the rule this state 
of affairs is not to be permitted to continue for more than a stated 
period. The classic statement of the rule is that of Professor Gray, 
"No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the 
interest."74 The object of this rule is to ensure that the stage at 
which all persons having interests in the particular property will 
be ascertained, so that between them they will have the full con-
trol of the property implied by absolute ownership, shall not be 
postponed for too long a period. The rule is concerned with the 
time at which interests, either legal or equitable, become identified 
with or vested in a particular person or group of persons. The rule 
thus deals with the commencement of interests. It is not concerned 
with their duration and this is so even if they are limited interests.75 
It has been said that it would be less confusing to describe the 
rule as one against remoteness of vesting.76 The possibility of its 
being called into operation in connection with a pure purpose 
trust or a trust for the purposes of an association would be raised 
if the disposition on trust were so expressed as to postpone the 
devotion of the property to those purposes until some time later 
than that at which the disposing instrument comes into effect. If 
that time could be later than the period prescribed by the rule, 
the disposition intended to promote those purposes would be void. 
In addition to the rules aimed at restraints on alienation and 
the rule against remoteness of vesting there has developed a third 
73 GRAY, REs'I'RAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY, 2d ed. (1895). 
74 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §201 (1942). Periods of gestation 
are included in the perpetuity period so far as they actually occur. 
75 Re Cassel, [1926] Ch. 358. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §234 
(1942). But it has been held by some courts in the United States that a private trust 
created to last longer than the perpetuity period is void. E.g., Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 
101, 52 S.E. (2d) 229 (1949), noted 48 MICH. L. REv. 235 (1949). 
76 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §2 (1942). 
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doctrine designed to implement the policy favoring circulation 
of property. One reason why the rule against remoteness of vest-
ing was made necessary was the ability of the absolute owner to 
dispose of his interest by distributing limited interests to various 
persons, some of which interests might commence in the future. 
The third doctrine has been made necessary because it became 
possible to create trusts by which the legal title can be separated 
from the equitable ownership. In recognition of the fact that a 
restriction on uniting the legal title with the equitable ownership 
would, if maintained for too long a period, hamper the circula-
tion of property, the common law has developed rules aimed at 
making trusts destructible. That the trustee may be able to change 
the character of the trust res by alienation is not enough. The 
policy requires that property such as funds of personalty should 
be expendable. The rule against remoteness of vesting plays some 
part to this end inasmuch as it is concerned with equitable inter-
ests becoming vested so that the absolute equitable ownership will 
be identified with ascertained persons within a ·reasonable time 
from the creation of the interests. But it is supplemented by other 
rules made necessary to cope with trusts. In England, if all the 
beneficiaries of a trust are ascertained and are of full age and 
capacity, they may collectively compel the termination of the trust 
and the transfer of the legal title to them even though this is in 
violation of the terms of the trust.77 They can thus assume full 
power to expend what was the trust property. In England, the 
policy in favor of circulation of property overrides any policy of 
giving effect to the expressed intent of settlors. In the United 
States a somewhat different attitude is taken. Rather more atten-
tion is given to the settlor's intention. It has been held that even 
though all beneficiaries of a private trust are sui juris and have 
vested interests, they cannot necessarily compel the termination 
of the trust if that would defeat one of the purposes of the trust.78 
But a settlor who attempts to set up a trust which will be inde-
structible forever will not have his intention carried out. If cor-
poration A is made trustee of property upon trust to manage and 
pay the net income to corporation B and the trust instrument pro-
vides that the trust is never to be terminated, corporation B may 
obtain a court order terminating the trust despite the terms of 
the trust instrument to the contrary.79 The Restatement of Prop-
11 Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (1841). 
78 Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1~89); TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §337 
(1935); Cleary, "Indestructible Testamentary Trusts," 43 YALE L. J. 393 (1934). 
79 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §378 (1944). 
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erty suggests that a restriction on destruction of a trust limited to 
last for the lives of beneficiaries alive when the trust is created 
would be valid.80 It has been suggested that a convenient measure 
of the limit would be the period prescribed by the rule against 
remoteness of vesting.81 
Thus in both English law and the law of American jurisdic-
tions, there is a bias against indestructible private trusts. Where 
the beneficiaries of a trust are individuals that bias can be given 
effect by allowing them to terminate the trust if they wish to do 
so. There is no need to speak in terms of limiting the duration 
of the trust since the courts are prepared to leave the matter in 
the hands of the beneficiaries who may be relied upon to act 
according to their self-interest. But trusts may be created for 
purposes so that there is no particular individual or group of 
individuals in whom the law can repose the power of terminating 
the trust as against the trustees. Thus when property is devoted 
upon trust for the care of particular animals, the policy to pro-
mote the circulation of property must be reflected in a rule con-
cerned with the duration of that trust. It seems to be now widely 
settled that where trusts for specific non-charitable purposes are 
not held void as lacking individual beneficiaries, a trust of this 
kind will be held good if it cannot last for a period longer than 
that prescribed by the rule against remoteness of vesting.82 Thus 
pure purpose trusts are catered for. The rules applicable to trusts 
for the purposes of non-charitable associations will be considered 
after an examination of the authorities. 
3. The Cases Considered. In the well known English case, 
Carne v. Long,83 the testator devised a particular freehold prop-
erty "unto the trustees for the time being of the Penzance Public 
Library, to hold to them and their successors forever, for the use, 
benefit, maintenance and support of the said library." The Pen-
zance Public Library had been established by voluntary subscrip-
tion of the members. Under its rules the property of the associa-
tion was vested in trustees and the association was not to be dis-
solved so long as ten members remained. On dissolution, dona-
tions were to be returned to donors and the proceeds of the sale 
of the remaining property were to be paid to another institution 
SOid., §381. 
81 SIMES, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FuTURE INTERESTS 405 (1951). 
82 Hart, "Some Reflections on Re Chardon," 53 L. Q. R.Ev. 24 at 35-52 (1937); Smith, 
"Honorary Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities,'' 30 Cot. L. R.Ev. 60 (1930); 1 Scon, 
TRUSTS §124.1 (1939). 
83 2 De G. F. &: J. 75, 45 Eng. Rep. 550 (1860). 
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in Penzance to be chosen by a majority of the members. These 
rules could be altered at general meetings in the manner prescribed 
by the rules. This power of amendment would have extended to 
the provisions regarding dissolution. Lord Campbell, L.C., after 
finding that the library was not a charity held the devise void. He 
said, 
"I look upon this as a devise for the benefit of a society of 
individuals in Penzance. My objection to it is, that it tends 
to a perpetuity, an objection with which the Vice-Chancellor 
does not appear to have dealt, but which appears to me wholly 
fatal to the devise. The clear intention of the testator, as 
expressed by the will, is, that this should be a gift in per-
petuity to this institution at Penzance. The gift is to the 
trustees for the time being of the society and their successors, 
to be held to them and their successors forever, they holding 
it for the use, benefit, maintenance and support of the library. 
If the devise had been in favour of the existing members of 
the society, and they had been at liberty to dispose of the 
property as they might think fit, then it might, I think, have 
been a lawful disposition and not tending to a perpetuity. 
But looking to the language of the rules of this society, it 
is clear that the library was intended to be a perpetual institu-
tion, and the testator must be presumed to have known what 
the regulations were. By one of these it is provided, that the 
society is not to be broken up so long as ten members remain. 
"The devise, therefore, is for the benefit of a subsisting so-
ciety, and one which is intended to subsist so long as ten 
members remain, and the property comprised in the devise 
is therefore to be taken out of commerce and to become 
inalienable, not for a life or lives in being and twenty one 
years afterwards, but for so long as ten of the members of the 
society shall remain. This seems to me a purpose which the 
the law will not sanction as tending to a perpetuity; and I 
think the recent decision in Thomson v. Shakespear4 is in 
point and governs the present case."85 
This long passage has been ~xtracted because the case is a 
puzzling one. The precise basis of Lord Campbell's decision is 
not altogether clear. If, for purposes of discussion, we can presume 
to look at the case in the light of later decisions we could say that 
if the devise had been directly to "the Penzance Public Library" 
without the intervention of trustees and without any statement 
that the property was to be held forever, it might have been read 
84 1 De G. F. &: J. 399, 45 Eng. Rep. 413 (1860). 
85 2 De G. F. &: J. 75 at 79-80, 45 Eng. Rep. 550 (1860). 
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as a devise to all the existing members. This result, as later cases 
show, 86 would be reached without any reference to the rules of 
the association. The fact ,that the members might continue to 
hold the property until such time as their association might be 
dissolved would not prevent the gift from having effect. 
If the devise had been directly to "the Penzance Public Li-
brary" without the intervention of trustees but with the statement 
that the property was to be held forever, the attempted restraint 
on alienation would on general principle be hdd repugnant to 
the interest given and the existing members would take free from 
the restraint. This result also would be reached without any 
reference to the rules of the association. 
If the devise had been to trustees "upon trust for the Penzance 
Public Library" without any statement that the property was to 
be held forever, it would on some later cases87 be held to be a trust 
for the individual members. Presumably those members would 
take interests absolute in the sense that if they were all sui juris 
they could join together and demand that the property be conveyed 
to them after amending their rules con~erning dissolution and 
voting for dissolution. 
In Carne v. Long, however, the effect of the statement that the 
trustees were to hold "to them and their successors forever" seems 
to have been to exclude the idea that the devise was in favor of the 
existing members as individuals. Did Lord Campbell then look at 
it as a disposition to future members as well as present members 
so that the rule against remoteness of vesting would strike down 
the devise? It would seem not. Once he accepted that it was some 
continuing thing which was the only beneficiary intended, he 
took that continuing thing to be the purpose of the association 
rather than the individual members from time to time. The trust 
was not for individuals but for a purpose which was not charitable. 
His reference to Thomson v. Shakespear bears this out. In Thom-
son v. Shakespear the trust was to keep in being a museum as a 
perpetual memorial to Shakespeare. That trust was held invalid 
because it offended the policy that property should not be put 
beyond the full control of individuals for too long a period. The 
purpose, being non-charitable, did not come within the exception 
in favor of charitable purposes based on the higher policy that 
endowments perpetual or otherwise, for the benefit of the public 
are to be encouraged. 
86 E.g., Re Smith, [1914] 1 Ch. 937. 
87 E.g., Re Delany's Estate, L.R. 9 Ir. R. 226 (1882). 
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Because in the pure purpose trust of the kind considered in 
Thomson v. Shakespear there is no individual beneficiary who can 
claim the property and terminate the trust, the law has developed 
the rule that such trusts must be so created as to terminate within 
the perpetuity period. 
Was Thomson v. Shakespear an authority which could properly 
control the decision in Carne v. Long? It is submitted that it was 
not. Though a trust for an association may be regarded as a trust 
for that association's objects, it is a trust for those objects as con-
trolled by the members. Authorities dealing with the control by 
members of association property allow that the members may dis-
solve the association at any time and, if it is a non-charitable asso-
ciation, may withdraw the property from the purpose. Thus a 
trust for an association differs in a material respect from a pure 
purpose trust. The presence in the former of control exercisable 
by the members means that the policy limiting the duration of pure 
purpose trusts is not infringed by a trust for an association's pur-
poses even though the association may last indefinitely. 
To say that a trust for an association is not simply a pure pur-
pose trust is not to say that it is, therefore, a trust for individuals 
so that the rule against remoteness of vesting becomes relevant. 
A member of an association does not have any substantial sever-
able interest in the association property before dissolution. This 
being so, it is inappropriate to treat dispositions to associations as 
dispositions to individuals of the kind with which the rule against 
remoteness of vesting is concerned. The true position would 
appear to be that a trust for an association is one for a purpose 
rather than for individuals but the purpose is sufficiently identified 
with particular individuals to remove the trust from the scope of 
the rule limiting the duration of pure purpose trusts. 
Of course, it is conceivable that a settlor intends to benefit 
the purpose of the association, to the exclusion of the individuals 
who are members, so clearly that he can be taken to say that if 
the association comes to an end, he still wishes his property to be 
devoted to that purpose, or to be enjoyed by persons other than the 
members. In this event, the reference to the association is merely 
a device for defining the purpose. The trust would be a pure pur-
pose trust and the duration limiting rule would apply. The devise 
in Carne v. Long could hardly be construed to be of this kind in 
,the face of the decisions upholding gifts directly to an association 
eo nomine. 
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Carne v. Long poses a fruitful idea insofar as it treats a trust 
for an association in which continuing succession is contemplated 
as a trust for a purpose. But insofar as it applies the rule as to 
limitation of duration appropriate to pure purpose trusts, the 
decision may, in the light of later developments, have lost some 
of its authority.88 
In Re Dutton89 the testator bequeathed a capital sum "unto 
the trustees for the time being of the Tunstall Athenaeum Mechan-
ics Institution, to be applied by them towards the building fund 
in connection therewith." The reason why this could not take 
effect as a gift to the individual members was considered earlier.90 
Following Thomson v. Shakespear and Carne v. Long the court 
held it to be void as tending to a perpetuity because of the prospect 
of indefinite duration of the association. An argument that the 
members might at any time dissolve the association and claim its 
property severally could not be put because under the Literary 
and Scientific Institutions Act 1854,91 on dissolution, its property 
would pass to another institution. This tended to make the dis-
position more like a pure purpose trust than that involved in 
Carne v. Long. It does not appear whether the members could 
have expended the amount given while the association remained 
in existence. If that had been possible, this degree of control 
should have made the disposition less like a pure purpose trust 
and should have been effective to take it outside the ambit of the 
policy underlying the perpetuity rule developed for such trusts. 
But for the court to view the matter in this light it would have 
been necessary to recognize that these dispositions are not pure 
purpose trusts and Carne v. Long was not conducive to such 
recognition being attained. 
The notion that a trust for the purposes of an association with 
a prospect of indefinite duration was bad as tending to a perpetuity, 
regardless of whether the members for the time being could dis-
ss In Re Clark's Trust, I Ch. D. 497 (1875), the testator directed a sum of money 
to be laid out and kept invested in the names of persons to be nominated from time to 
time to be trustees thereof by the Ringwood Friendly Society who were to hold upon 
trust to apply the dividends and income therefrom in aid of the funds of the society. Hall, 
V.C., held that this was not a charitable bequest and that, under the authority of Carne 
v. Long, it was invalid as creating a perpetuity. It is possible to read this disposition 
as intended to give the association an interest in the income only, so that if the associa-
tion came to an end, the corpus could not be disposed of by the members but would 
be held on a resulting trust for the testator's estate. Viewed in this light, it would be 
more akin to a pure purpose trust and the Thomson v. Shakespear limitation-of-duration 
principle would be appropriate. 
89 4 Ex. D. 54 (1878). 
90 Note 42 supra. 
91 17 & 18 Viet., c. 112, §30. 
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pose of the property given, was kept alive in Re Amos.92 Here 
a bequest of leaseholds and devises of freeholds directly to a trade 
union were held bad on the ground of perpetuity (inter alia) al-
though the question whether the members might sell the property 
or might dissolve the association and divide the property was not 
considered. The dispositions here were to the association directly 
and were apt for the salvage construction whereby it could have 
been held that the gifts were to the existing members. North, J ., 
held, however, that they were gifts to purposes.93 This treatment 
of the dispositions proved significant for later developments. It 
will be recalled that in all the earlier association cases in which the 
disposition had been held invalid as a perpetuity, there was some-
thing in the terms of the disposition which prevented it being 
construed as a disposition to a class of individuals and the court 
had looked on it as a disposition to a purpose. These constituted 
one line of cases. Alongside that line of cases was another consist-
ing of Cocks v. Manners,94 Re Delany's Estate,95 Re Wilkinson's 
Trusts9 6 and Bradshaw v. ]ackman91 in which the difficulties at-
tached to purpose trusts were avoided by construing the disposi-
tion as a gift to existing members.98 Perpetuity questions did not 
arise because this construction was given only in those cases in 
which, under the terms of the gift, all the members of the ascertain-
able class would receive present interests disposable by joint action. 
It was not necessary to speak of perpetuities in these cases but if 
one did, it could be said that there was no perpetuity because the 
members could expend the property given. 
The significance of Re A mos is that a disposition, which in form 
called for the application of the Cocks v. Manners doctrine, was 
treated as governed by the Carne v. Long doctrine; the disposition 
was one which if treated as one to individuals would be held good 
but if treated as one to a purpose would be held bad as a perpetuity. 
A likely result of this would be to cause the two lines of authority 
to converge as one. 
This result occurred when Re Glarke99 was decided. The dis-
position here was a bequest "to the committee for the time being, 
92 [1891] 3 Ch. 159. Note 44 supra. 
93 The reasons for this view have been considered earlier. Note 44 supra. 
94 L.R. 12 Eq. 574 (1871), note 34 supra. 
95 L.R. 9 Ir. R. 226 (1882), note 35 supra. 
06 19 L.R. Ir. 531 (1887), note 40 supra. 
97 21 L.R. Ir. 12 (1887), note 41 supra. 
98 The inclusion of Cocks v. Manners in this category may be questioned in view of 
the remarks of Chatterton, V.C., in Morrow v. McConville (note 37 supra) but most 
later cases justify its presence. 
99 [1901] 2 Ch. 110. 
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of the Corps of Commissionaires in London to aid in the purchase 
of their barracks, or in any other way beneficial to that corps." 
This gift, looked at in the light of the Cocks v. Manners line of 
cases, might have been regarded as one to the committee upon trust 
for the existing members of the corps. As such, there would be no 
perpetuity problem. Alternatively, it might have been regarded 
in the light of the Carne v. Long line of authority as a disposition 
in the nature of a purpose trust. As a purpose trust under the latter 
line of authority it would have to be held void as tending to a 
perpetuity since the association might last indefinitely. Byrne, J ., ' 
considered both lines of authority, distinguishing the Carne v. 
Long line and following the Cocks v. Manners line. In so doing, he 
introduced a new test of whether a disposition to an association 
would tend to a perpetuity. The mere fact that the association 
might be perpetual did not invalidate the gift. The test was 
whether the existing members would be free to expend the prop-
erty as they pleased. If it appeared that the legacy was one which, 
by the terms of the gift, or which by reason of the association's 
constitution, tended to a perpetuity, the gift would be bad. In 
this case there was nothing in the terms of the gift or in the group's 
constitution to prevent all the members from dealing with the 
fund intended for building or with the building just as they pleased 
and so the gift was good. 
The effect of Re Clarke was to derive from the Cocks v. Man-
ners type of case, a new test of perpetuity for the cases where the 
disposition could not be held to be one for the members indi-
vidually. That this was so is demonstrated by Re Dr?fmmond.100 
By his will, a testator gave his residuary estate to his trustees upon 
trust for sale and conversion and directed them to hold the pro-
ceeds upon trust for the Old Bradfordians' Club, London.· By a 
codicil, he declared that the money given in the will should be 
used by the club for such purpose as the committee for the time 
being might determine. Eve, J ., said that he could not hold that 
the disposition was one to the members individually. There was 
a trust of a kind which he did not describe but which, presumably, 
must have been a trust for non-charitable purposes. Following Re 
Clarke, the disposition, though for-an association which might last 
indefinitely, was not void as a perpetuity since there was nothing 
to prevent the committee spending the legacy in any manner they 
might decide. Re Drummond received the approval of the House 
of Lords in Macauley v. O'Donnell.101 
100 [1914] 2 Ch. 90. 
101 (1931), reported in a note in [1943] Ch. 435. In Re Price, [1943] Ch, 422, where 
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Summing up, the effect of the cases from England considered 
to this stage is that a disposition to an association eo nomine which 
cannot be read as a gift to the existing members, may operate as a 
disposition on trust for a purpose if it does not tend to a perpetuity. 
It will ·not tend to a perpetuity if there is nothing to prevent the 
members from disposing of the property subject to the trust either 
by expending it or disposing of it among themselves upon dissolu-
tion. Such a disposition, though for a purpose, has two attributes 
which render it mor~ acceptable to the legal system than the 
questionable pure purpose trust. They are, first, the presence of 
individuals who have an interest in the purpose by reason of their 
membership which justifies their suing to enforce the trust and, 
secondly, the disposition is made to an association which can be 
dissolved at any time upon which dissolution the property will 
ordinarily be divided among the members. The first attribute 
meets the objection based on Morice v. Bishop of Durham. The 
second means that the continuance of the trust is at the sufferance 
of individuals and this satisfies the policy underlying the law relat-
ing to perpetuities. 
In the United States, in the older cases, when a trust disposition 
to an association could not be construed as one to the existing 
members, it was held to be void without any consideration of 
whether it could be upheld as a trust for the association's purposes. 
In Kain v. Gibboney102 the testatrix disposed of all her property 
by will in the. event that she might later become a member of any 
of the religious communities attached to the Roman Catholic 
Church in the following terms: "to the aforesaid Richard V. 
Wheelan, bishop as aforesaid, or his successor in said dignity who 
is hereby constituted a trustee for the benefit of the community 
of which I may be a member, the said property or money to be 
expended by the said trustee for the use and benefit of said com-
munity." The Supreme Court of the United States held that the 
Bishop would not take beneficially but the attempted trust, if 
non-charitable, would fail because the beneficiaries were uncertain. 
The disposition was considered to be one to the association as 
such and not one to the individual members. The beneficiaries 
the testatrix left half of her residuary estate to the Anthroposophical Society in Great 
Britain "to be used at the discretion of the chairman and executive council of the society 
for carrying on the teachings of the founder, Dr. Rudolf Steiner," the disposition, though 
not one for the individual members but for a purpose, was valid even if that purpose 
were regarded as non-charitable. It was valid because the full amount of the gift could 
be spent. 
102101 U.S. 362 (1879). See also Mayfield v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 150 Md. 157, 
132 A. 595 (1926); Lane v. Eaton, 69 Minn. 141, 71 N.W. 1031 (1897); Murray v. Miller, 
178 N.Y. 316, 70 N.E. 870 (1904). 
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were uncertain because the members would be constantly changing 
and it would always be uncertain as to who might be its members 
at any given time. No member could ever claim any individual · 
benefit from the bequest, and the community, having no legal 
existence, could never have standing in court to call the trustees 
to account. 
On the other hand, some courts have found that the settlor 
intended to benefit the individuals who are members of the asso-
ciation from time to time. In Old South Society v. Crocker103 land 
had been conveyed in 1669 to certain persons named "and to such 
as they shall associate to themselves, their heirs and successors 
forever," for the stated purpose of erecting a church and a dwelling 
house for the ministers from time to time admitted. The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, after holding that this did not 
constitute a public charity, regarded the disposition as creating 
a trust for persons who from time to time might be members of the 
religious society which the deed of conveyance contemplated. As 
such it did not lack beneficiaries and was valid on that account. 
The disposition was not considered offensive to the Rule against 
Perpetuities because as the court said, "the entire interest at any 
time is represented by known persons living; to wit, the legal 
estate by trustees, there being always power in the court, in cases 
of necessity, to supply trustees in whom the estate will vest; the 
equitable interest by those persons who then constitute the body 
of the associates-or the society, who may be ascertained according 
to its rules governing membership." This way of looking at the 
disposition ignored the relevance of the rule against remoteness of 
vesting. If a trust for future members was constituted, the trust 
was not so created as to require their interests to vest within the 
perpetuity period. The ultimate decision could now be based on 
a holding that the trust was for the purposes of the association 
and that as the members, though only incidental beneficiaries, 
presumably had the power to dispose of the property, a perpetuity 
was not created. 
Some courts have reached a result similar to that arrived at 
by English cases, by holding that the association can be a bene-
ficiary and that a trust for it is accordingly valid.104 The Supreme 
103 119 Mass. 1 (1875). See also Ward v. McMath, 153 Ark. 506, 241 S.W. 3 (1922) 
(deed conveying land to individuals as trustees of a camp of United Confederate Veterans 
and their successors and assigns construed in the same way as that in Old South Society 
v. Crocker and therefore not void as a perpetuity); Clark v. Brown, (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) 
108 s.w. 421. 
104 Ruddick v. Albertson, 154 Cal. 640, 98 P. 1045 (1908); Amish v. Gelhaus, 71 Iowa 
170, 32 N.W. 318 (1887); Bancroft v. Cook, 264 Mass. 343, 162 N.E. 691 (1928), in which 
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Court in Kain v. Gibboney had proceeded on the basis that there 
was no person who could enforce the trust. If this is the only 
objection to an argument that a trust for an association as such is 
valid, it has gone because it is now settled that a trust for the pur-
poses of an association may be enforced at the suit of the mem-
bers.105 The fact that the membership may be large does not mili-
tate against this since the class suit or representative action provides 
a convenient procedure for protecting the rights of a large group. 
The framers of the Restatement of Trusts endorse the view 
that an unincorporated association may be the beneficiary of a 
trust106 and the compilers of the Restatement of Property indicate 
that a disposition of property on trust for an association is not in-
valid if "an unqualified power to expend the corpus thereof for 
one or more of the purposes of the association is given to the 
trustee, or to the members of the association, or to some other 
person or persons."107 
4. Dispositions Which Infringe the Law Relating to Per-
petuities. Numerous cases illustrate the kinds of dispositions 
to associations which fail. 
(a) Trusts to Pay Income. One type is the provision of a 
fund with a direction that only the income of the fund shall be 
applied to a specific purpose or the general purposes of the associa-
tion.108 Sometimes in this type of disposition the fund is given to 
Re Drummond, [1914] 2 Ch. 90 (note 10D supra) was cited approvingly by the court. 
Lounsbury v. Trustees of Square Lake Burial Assn., 170 Mich. 645, 137 N.W. 513 (1912). 
105 Note 69 supra. 
106 TRUSTS REsl"ATEMENT §119 (1935). 
107 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §380 (1944). 
10s Re Clark's Trust, 1 Ch. D. 497 (1875) (legacy to be laid out in investments in 
names of trustees of a friendly society who were to hold upon trust to apply the income 
in aid of the funds of the society held void). Re Swain, 99 L.T. 604 (1908) (legacy to 
trustees to apply the income to the chess club of Penzance "for the support and further-
ance of chess and the perpetuity of the club" and if the club should cease to exist, to 
apply the income to the Penzance Public Library both held void); Re Clifford, 81 L.J. 
Ch. 220 (1912) (legacy to angling and preservation society with direction that it be 
invested and the income applied in re-stocking the waters of the society or for other 
purposes as the president or committee should decide held void); Re Patten, [1929] 2 
Ch. 276 (legacies to named clubs on trust to pay the interest yearly to non-charitable 
funds respectively kept by each club held void); Re Wilkinson, [1941) N.Z.L.R. 1065, 
[residue to trustees (i) upon trust to pay annuities to persons named and from time to 
time to divide the balance of the income into five equal parts one of which was to be 
paid to the League of Nations Union of New Zealand for its general purposes and (ii) 
upon the cesser of the interest of the survivor of the annuitants to hold four-ninths of 
the residue upon trust to divide the income therefrom in the manner directed in (i)) 
Kennedy, J., held that there were two gifts to the League of Nations Union of New 
Zealand. The first was good. The second was void. 
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trustees outside the association upon trust to apply the income in 
the manner indicated.109 Sometimes the fund is given to the as-
sociation. ~ 
If the donor directs that the income is to be applied for a 
specific purpose rather than the general purposes of the association 
the disposition could never be construed as giving any interest 
present or future to any members of the association. The disposi-
tion would be a pure purpose trust and as such it would be invalid 
unless the duration of the trust were limited to a period within 
that prescribed by the rule against remoteness of vesting. 
Suppose, however, that the donor directs that the income is to 
be applied for the general purposes of the association. If the 
beneficiary of a trust to pay income indefinitely were a corpora-
tion the direction to pay income for an indefinite period would 
be presumed to be a gift of the corpus. If a donor gives the 
rents and profits of Blackacre or the income of a trust fund to 
an individual without limitation of time, and makes no other 
disposition of the capital, he is considered to give an absolute 
interest in the fruits which carries with it an absolute interest 
in the tree.11° Under this rule the law takes liberties with what 
the donor has said. The law being anxious to find a resting place 
for the absolute interest in any particular property re-writes the 
disposition in order to make it effective rather than let it fail 
under the law relating to perpetuities. But this can be done only 
at the cost of disregarding the donor's expressed intention. Some 
excuse for this re-writing is provided by the view that although 
a disposition of incom~ indefinitely is not exactly the conferring 
of absolute ownership it is the giving of a large feature of 
absolute ownership. The difference between them is so small 
that when it is a question of a court choosing between giving 
effect to the disposition and striking it down as a perpetuity, 
the court can choose the former and can re-write the disposition. 
But the excuse for re-writing depends on the donee of the in-
come being somebody whom the law can regard as an owner. 
Property can be given to an individual absolutely without re-
gard to what he does with it. By re-writing the disposition 
when it is one to an individual there can be no suggestion that 
100 E.g., Re Swain, note 108 supra. 
110 THEOBALD, I.Aw OF WILLS, 10th ed., 334 (1947); I ScO"IT, TRusrs §128.2 (1939); 
Re Chambers, 16 Ont. L.R. 62 (1907); Re Hagerman, 13 Ont. W.N. 406 (1918); Re Knight, 
[1937] O.R. 462, [1937] 2 D.L.R. 285; Danker v. Cooper, ll4 N.J. Eq. 283, 168 A. 640 
(1933); Haydon's Estate, 334 Pa. 403, 6 A. (2d) 581 (1939); Congregational Union of 
N.S.W. v. Thistlethwayte, 87 CL.R. 375 (1952), [1952] Arg. L.R. 729. 
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the law is ignoring any. desire by the donor to benefit some con-
tinuing purpose. When the disposition is one to a corporation 
it is possible that the donor was solely concerned to advance 
the continuing purpose of the corporation by yearly grants of 
income and that he did not intend to confer any benefit on those 
who might be entitled to the corporation's property on its dis-
solution. In this respect a disposition of income indefinitely to a 
corporation might have been thought to be outside the operation of 
the rule in question. But the courts have assimilated corporate legal 
personality to individual legal personality so far that the rule 
has been carried over to such dispositions to corporations. Dis-
regard of a donor's intention to advance the corporation's con-
tinuing purpose is the result of substantial equating of corpora-
tions to individuals. When the disposition is one to an unin-
corporated association the donor's intention to advance the as-
sociation's continuing purpose indefinitely cannot be ignored. 
On the foregoing analysis such a disposition is one to a continu-
ing purpose. A purpose cannot be the owner of an interest unless 
it is personified. It is thus less easy to say that the donor can be 
presumed to have intended to give an absolute interest to some-
body. The doubt as to whether he intended the members on disso-
_lution to have the corpus between them remains in the foreground 
and is not obscured by the interposition of an interest-holding 
entity. This doubt is enough to deter a court from re-writing the 
disposition. Accordingly, the rule cannot save dispositions of in-
come indefinitely to unincorporated associations even if the income 
is to be applied not for a specific purpose but for the general 
purposes of the association.111 
What perpetuity rule is applicable, then, when the donor 
directs income to be applied for the general purposes of the 
association? In the abstract it might appear that there is a 
preliminary question of construction to determine the donor's 
intention. On the one hand, the donor may intend that the 
benefit to the association is to last only so long as the associa-
111 It was held in England, however, in Re Jones, [1950] 2 All E.R. 239, that where 
a testator directed payment of annual sums of fixed amount in the nature of perpetual 
annuities to certain unincorporated societies, any such society, whether charitable or not, 
could, if it wished, demand payment from the trustees of a capital sum in cash instead 
of a sum paid over a number of years. The judgment of Danckwerts, J., does not contain 
any consideration of the effect of dispositions to associations or the operation of the law 
of perpetuities in this area. The proposition that the disposition was in the nature of a 
perpetual annuity involves a departure from previous judicial views as to the nature of 
unincorporated associations inasmuch as it appears to equate the association to a corpo-
ration for this purpose. It may be that the explanation of this case is that it was not 
a truly adversary proceeding. 
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tion remains undissolved and that on dissolution there is to be 
a resulting trust to the donor or his successors. English courts 
appear to have assumed that trusts to apply income for the 
general purposes of associations are never intended to give any 
interest in the corpus to the members on dissolution.112 Under 
this approach although the donor's resulting trust is a vested 
interest113 the prior trust being one in which no individual 
has any interest is a pure purpose trust and is therefore invalid 
if it can last beyond the period prescribed by the rule against 
remoteness of vesting. On the other hand, the donor may intend 
to put the property away from him altogether so that he does 
not have any interest by way of resulting trust; he intends the 
income of the fund to be used while the association remains 
undissolved but that on dissolution the members at that time 
shall be entitled to the corpus. If such a construction is pos-
sible it might be said that the policy underlying perpetuity doc-
trine is satisfied by the ability of the members for the time being 
to dissolve the association and divide the trust fund between 
themselves. The trust before dissolution would not be a pure 
purpose trust. 
That it is the practice of the English courts to read every trust 
to pay income to an association as a trust for the association while 
it exists is suggested by several cases. This is the practice even 
when the corpus is given to the association itself upon trust to 
apply the income indefinitely to one or all of its purposes.114 Here 
since the association is the recipient of the corpus, it might 
seem arguable that the donor intended that if the association be 
dissolved, the members might divide the corpus between them 
in the same manner as their other property can be divided. 
From that it would seem to follow that if the association could 
be dissolved at any time, the gift would not be void as tending to 
a perpetuity. If the donor directs that the income be applied to a 
specific purpose, this argument might not be available but if he 
merely directs the application of the income to the general pur-
poses of the association, it would be more cogent. In Re Cliffordpr. 
however, where the legacy was to the association itself and the 
income could be applied to the general purposes of the association 
112 Pages 68-69 infra. 
113 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINsr PERPETUITI.ES, 4th ed., §603.9 (1942); l! SCOIT, TRUSTS 
§401.5 (1939). 
114 E.g., Re Clifford, 81 L.J. Ch. 220 (1912); Re Patten, [1929) 2 Ch. 276. 
115 81 L.J. Ch. 220 (1912). 
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consistently with the terms of the legacy, Swinfen-Eady, J., held 
that it was not a gift which the members could divide among them-
selves on dissolution and it was therefore void as tending to a 
perpetuity. The inference appears to be that on dissolution of the 
association, the corpus would be held on a resulting trust for the 
testator's estate. If a disposition under which the income is 
to be applied to the association's general purposes can be treated 
in this way, then a fortiori a gift by which the income is to be 
applied to a specific purpose stated by the donor cannot be treated 
differently. 
In Macauley v. O'Donnell116 the testatrix devised and be-
queathed her residuary estate "unto the Folkestone Lodge of the 
Theosophical Society ... absolutely for the maintenance and 
improvement of the Theosophical Lodge at Folkestone" and de-
clared that the receipt of the treasurer of the lodge should be 
a sufficient discharge. Proceeding on the basis that the associa-
tion did not have charitable objects, the House of Lords held 
the disposition void as tending to a perpetuity. The reference to 
"maintenance and improvement" of the lodge showed an intention 
to impose a trust which would not permit the corpus to be ex-
pended. The gift, therefore, was in the form of an endowment 
and since the society was, according to its form, perpetual, the 
gift was bad. It might be thought that the language of the 
testatrix was apt to show an intention to part with the property 
absolutely. By making a disposition to an association which, under 
the general principles governing unincorporated associations, can 
be dissolved with a consequential distribution of assets among 
the members, she must be taken to have intended an endmvment 
which was not perpetual but for as long as all members thought 
fit. By choosing the association as the recipient of her bounty, 
she expresses her belief in the good faith of its members and as-
sumes the risk that the disposition will prompt them to decide 
on a dissolution not othenvise contemplated. This decision of the 
House of Lords probably does not exclude the possibility that a 
donor may give a legacy to an association with the intention 
that only the income is to be expended during the lifetime of 
the association but that on its dissolution the corpus may be divid-
ed among the individual members. But the decision does require 
a donor who has that intention to make his intention apparent 
in very clear terms. 
116 (1931), reported in a note in [1943] Ch. 435. 
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· · The Connecticut case of Wilbur v. Portland Trust Co.111 may 
be contrasted with Macauley v. O'Donnell. The testator beqeathed 
.$18,000 to a trust company upon trust "to invest and re-invest 
and to pay over the income and as much or all of the principal as 
.they may deem necessary, it to be the sole judge, to Warren Lodge 
F. A. & A. M. of Portland, Connecticut .... " The Supreme 
Court of Errors held that the gift was not void as a perpetuity. 
The intention of the testator, it was said, was obviously to dis-
pose of the trust fund completely as to both income and corpus. 
The court treated the association as an entity without discussion 
of its reasons for so doing. If the doctrine of Re Drummond is 
followed, an English court faced with a similar disposition could 
agree. that the association could be beneficiary. The Connecticut 
court said that the interest of the association was vested so 
.that the rule against remoteness of vesting was satisfied. Having 
found that an absolute interest was given, the court held, adopt-
ing the Restatement of Trusts,118 that since the trustee could termi-
nate the trust at any time by paying over the principal, -the gift did 
not offend . the law relating to perpetuities. This decision has 
been questioned on the basis that the power to expend the corpus 
.was not possessed by the members but depended upon the exer-
cise of a discretion in the trustee who was not under the control 
of the members.U 9 
The opinion suggests that in trusts for -associations in which 
the members or persons under their· control are not given power 
to destroy the trust the rule against remoteness of vesting is not 
_required to. be supplemented by any other perpetuity rule. In 
this respect it seems at variance with the English decisions. The 
fact that the testator was taken to have given an absolute interest 
would not explain this decision unless it can be understood as im-
plying that on a proper construction of the disposition the members 
on dissolution could claim the corpus. 
To sum up, whether the corpus is given to trustees outside the 
association or is put in the hands of the association itself, the_ rule 
appears to be that if the donor directs, expressly or impliedly, that 
the income only shall be expended, the disposition will be void 
as a perpetuity if the trust is not limited by the terms of the dis-
posing instrument to the period prescribed by the rule against re-
moteness of vesting. The limitation on the duration of the trust 
117121 Conn. 535, 186 A. 499 (1936). 
118 TRUSTS, REsrATEMENT §119, comment c (1935). 
119 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS 410-4ll (1951) •. 
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should be found in the disposing instrument. If the constitution 
of the association provides that it shall be dissolved at a time within 
the perpetuity period, reliance should not be placed on this since 
ordinarily the members of an association can jointly alter that 
provision to extend the life of the association indefinitely. 
(b) Dispositions of Specific Property With Direction That 
It Is Not To Be Sold. Another type of disposition to an associa-
tion which is often held void as a perpetuity is that in which 
certain property is given with a direction that that property shall 
never be sold. 
In Queensland Trustees, Ltd. v. W oodward,12° the testator de-
vised land to trustees of a Masonic lodge and stated a request 
"that the said property shall not be sold but shall be used for the 
purpose of building a lodge-room and hall thereon and generally 
to promote the welfare of the members of the said lodge and 
their successors." In Munster and Leinster B_ank, Ltd. v. A-G,121 
the testator bequeathed leasehold premises to a branch of the 
Catholic Young Men's Society of Ireland declaring "that the said 
house shall be used for the purposes of the said Society and that 
it is my express wish that the said house shall not be sold or other-
wise disposed of."122 In each case the gift was held to be void as 
a perpetuity. If similar dispositions were made to incorporated 
bodies, the disposition would take effect as a disposition of an 
absolute interest. But when the group intended to be _benefited 
by such a disposition is unincorporated and does not exisi: for 
charitable objects, the direction has been held to operate in an-
other way. It is regarded as showing a clear intention on the 
part of the donor to make a disposition to the continuing group 
enterprise rather than the existing members.123 This introduces 
the long-held notion that a disposition cannot be made to an 
unincorporated continuing group enterprise with the result that 
the court does not reach the stage where it could consider the 
direction for what it is, a restraint on alienation. If that notion 
is discredited by the cases exemplified by Re Drummond,124 it 
becomes necessary to consider the effect of the attempted restraint 
on alienation. 
120 [1912] Queens. St. R. 291. 
121 [1940] Ir. R. 19. 
122 See also Gleeson v. Phelan, 15 St. R. (N.S.W.) 30 (1914). 
123 Munster and Leinster Bank, Ltd. v. A-G., [1940] Ir. R. 19 at 27; Gleeson v. 
Phelan, note 122 supra, at 33. 
12! Note 100 supra. 
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A settlor may, when he makes a gift in trust, validly require the 
trustee to retain the original trust property for the duration of the 
trust. In some American jurisdictions there is authority for the 
proposition that the restraint will be valid even though the trust 
is a private one and may last beyond the perpetuity period.1211 In 
at least one other American jurisdiction it has been held that the 
p·ower of alienation cannot be withheld from the trustee for a 
time longer than the perpetuity period.126 The author of Part 
26 of the American Law of Property dealing with restraints on 
alienation is of the opinion that the denial of powers of alienation 
to trustees is not nearly as objectionable as a valid restraint upon a 
beneficial interest. One of the reasons for that opinion is that the 
restraint, being limited to the duration of the trust, will not tie up 
property indefinitely. Although a private trust may be so created 
that it will continue beyond the perpetuity period, such private 
trusts will, he says, be uncommon. When the private trust is for 
the benefit of individuals, this may be true. In such cases the rule 
against remoteness of vesting prevents such a trust lasting very 
long after the perpetuity period has run. But if the trust is one 
for the purposes of a non-charitable association which may last 
indefinitely, the restraint would tie up property indefinitely. 
Even so it may not be considered objectionable as a restraint on 
alienation since a court of equity has power to authorize a trustee to 
sell under certain circumstances.127 Probably the real effect of the 
direction that the trustees are never to sell when the trust is for 
an association is that it excludes any suggestion that the settlor 
intended to give the property to the association absolutely. It 
shows that the members were ·never to have the power to divide 
the property between them on dissolution of the association. The 
vice then is that such a disposition is more akin to a pure purpose 
trust in that it does not give any potential individual interest. As 
has been seen earlier, such a trust will not be valid if it could last 
beyond the period prescribed by the rule against remoteness of 
vesting. · 
III. SHOULD NoT EVERY DisPos1noN To AN AssocIAnoN BE 
CONSIDERED ONE ON TRUST FoR !Ts PURPOSES? 
The development of doctrine effected by the authorities ex-
amined to this stage suggests a line of inquiry concerning those 
125 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §26.13, n. I (1952). 
126 Colonial Trust Co., v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 135 A. 555 (1926). 
127 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §26.13 (1952); 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS §190.4 (1939); 3 
id., §381. 
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dispositions which are capable of being construed as gifts to the 
existing members.128 That construction was first used to save gifts 
to associations at a time when it was thought that a gift to a continu-
ing group enterprise not represented by a corporation would be 
void. 
That construction served a useful purpose up to a point. It 
could not be applied if the number of existing members was large 
and the property given was of a kind which could not be held by 
a large number of co-owners without serious conveyancing diffi-
culties ensuing.129 Furthermore, when it was applied there was 
some temptation to say that the existing members took either as 
joint tenants or tenants in common and that their rights with re-
spect to the property were governed by the incidents of these well 
established forms of co-ownership thus frustrating the purpose of 
association.130 
Since in cases like Re Drummond the English courts have 
recognized that a disposition to an association may be a disposition 
to a purpose primarily and individuals only secondarily and since 
the only way in which property may be devoted to a purpose is by 
the medium of a trust, one may ask why should not every disposi-
tion to an association be taken to be intended to operate as a trust 
for a purpose. This view of such dispositions would overcome the 
conveyancing difficulties which would ensue from a thorough-
going application of the "gift-to-existing-members" construction 
device. 
Recognition that the group purpose is the beneficiary intended 
and that property can properly be devoted to that purpose would 
obviate other difficulties which accrue from looking at the gift 
as one to individuals. If the gift can be read as being for the 
benefit of future members as well as existing members, difficulties 
arising from the rule against remoteness of vesting will be felt. 
But if the gift is looked on as one for the purposes of the associa-
tion, these difficulties do not appear.131 
128 Part II-A supra [55 l\I1cH. L. R.Ev. 67 at 81 (1956)]. 
129 Hogan v. Byrne, 13 Ir. C.L.R. 166 (1862), note 31 supra. 
130 Byam v. Bickford, 140 Mass. 31, 2 N.E. 687 (1885), note 14 supra. 
131 In Pushor v. Hilton, 123 Me. 225, 122 A. 673 (1923), the testatrix gave the residue 
of her estate to the "Corinthian Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons, Lodge No. 95 of 
Hartland, Maine . . ." directing that "no conditions be imposed upon the Lodge in 
taking the above property except that it shall be applied for the benefit of Corinthian 
Lodge only. To have and to hold unto the Corinthian Lodge of Free and Accepted 
Masons, their successors and assigns forever." This was held to give the legal title to the 
existing members upon trust for the lodge itself. The court said that the reference to 
"successors and assigns" merely recognized that changes must take place from time to 
time in the personnel of the trustees and that this was not strictly necessary because 
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When ·a disposition is made to an association eo nomine direct-
ly· by way of gift rather than trust and that association has chari-
table objects, English courts hold that a gift has been made to char-
ity even though the terms of the gift do not include any express 
statement of purposes.132 There are comparable American deci-
sions.133 The courts do not appear to be troubled by the fact that 
the association, as such, lacks capacity to hold the legal title. The 
dispositions to associations which have been upheld in this way 
have usually been testamentary dispositions of personalty. In 
England, from 1736 to 1891, the problem could not arise in re-
lation to devises because the Georgian Statute of Mortmain134 
in force during that period allowed land, or personalty to be laid 
out in the purchase of land, to be given in trust for any charitable 
use only by a deed inter vivos executed and enrolled in the man-
ner prescribed by the act. As has been suggested earlier,135 the 
difficulties as to the residence of the legal title are not so pressing 
when the property given to an association is personalty. In many 
of the bequests the testator has directed payment to the treasurer 
of the association. This avoids the administrative difficulty that 
the association could not be trustee, by making the treasurer 
trustee.1-36 Even where the will contains no express direction to 
pay the bequest to any particular officer, the court will direct 
that the bequest be paid to a particular officer thus in effect ap-
pointing a competent trustee.137 Since the courts see in such gifts 
equity does not allow a trust to perish for want of a trustee. The court did not discuss 
the possibility of the trust being void as a perpetuity. 
132 Cocks v. Manners, L.R. 12 Eq. 574 (1871) (gift by will to "the Sisters of the 
Charity of St. Paul at Selley Oak" held to be a charitable gift); Re Tyler, [1891] 3 Ch. 
252 at 258 (bequest "to the trustees for the time being of the London Missionary Society" 
is a gift for the Society's charitable purposes); Re Delany, [1902] 2 Ch. 642 (gifts by will 
to M.D., H.M., and A.C., "Nazareth House, Hammersmith or their successors," to E.M., 
and M.L., "of the Convent of the Assumption, Wellington Road, Bromley by Bow or 
their successors" held to be given to the legatees as holders of offices in and for the 
benefit of the associations in which they held office, and that, as the purposes of those 
associations were charitable, the gifts were indistinguishable from the gifts in Cocks v. 
Manners supra); Re Schoales, [1930] 2 Ch. 75; Re Barnes, [1922], reported in a note in 
[1930] 2 Ch. 80; Re Brown, (1898) 1 Ir. R. 423; Armstrong v. Reeves, 25 L.R. Ir. 325 
(1890); Re Motherwel~, [1910] 1 Ir. R. 249; Re Gwynne, 22 O.W.R. 405, 3 Ont. W.N. 
1428, 5 D.L.R. 713 (1912); Hardey v. Tory, 32 C.L.R. 592 (1923); Gleeson v. Phelan, 15 
St. R. (N.S.W.) 30 (1914); The Perpetual Trustee Co. v. Shelley, 21 St. R. (N.S.W.) 
426 (1921). The last case was concerned with charitable corporations but it recognizes 
the authority of the English cases on the point under discussion. 
133 Matter of Winburn, 139 Misc. 5, 247 N.Y.S. 584 (1931); Matter of Patterson, 
139 Misc. 872, 249 N.Y. S. 441 (1931). 
134 9 Geo. 2, c. 36 (1736). 
135 Page 78 supra [55 MICH. L. REv. 67]. 
136 Waller v. Childs, Amb. 524, 27 Eng. Rep. 338 (1765). 
137 Walsh v. Gladstone, 1 Ph. 290, 41 Eng. Rep. 642 (1843); In the Goods of Mc-
Auliffe, [1895] P. 290. 
1956] UNINCORPORATED AssocIATIONS 259 
a disposition to charity and since charity is a purpose the disposi-
tion can take effect only as a trust. But as such it attracts the equi-
table jurisdiction to save a trust from failing for want of a trustee. 
The repeal of the Georgian Statute of Mortmain by the Mort-
main and Charitable Uses Act 189!138 has made possible in Eng-
land devises upon trust for charitable purposes under conditions 
prescribed in the latter act and the jurisdiction to appoint trustees 
exercised in relation to bequests would seem to extend to de-
vises.139 
When the disposition is one inter vivos and the property given 
is personalty the absence of cases would seem to indicate that no 
problem is considered to exist. Just as the law apparently assumes 
that an association can receive members' subscriptions through 
its treasurer so it can receive sums of money by way of gift for its 
purposes without any difficulty being felt as to the location of 
the legal title. 
When the inter vivos disposition concerns realty it might be 
said that since there is no capable grantee the conveyance is a 
nullity. Though there may be an intention to confer a benefit 
on charity, the gift is imperfect and it could be put that by ap-
pointing a competent trustee a court of equity would be acting 
to perfect an imperfect gift. 
An alternative view would be that the conveyance vests the 
legal title in the individual members upon trust for the purposes 
of the association but since by reason of their number they do 
not represent suitable trustees, the court may appoint some smaller 
group of persons to be trustees. On this latter view it could not 
be said that the court was perfecting an imperfect gift. On the 
authorities discussed earlier, this view would appear to be ap-
propriate in England. In America although there are instances 
where a disposition for charitable purposes has been held to vest 
the legal title in the individual members as trustees, 140 the more 
usual view is that the donor intends to vest the legal title in the 
association, as such, which is regarded by most courts as having 
no capacity to take title to property. When the disposition is 
testamentary, however, the weight of American authority sup-
ports the proposition that the court can appoint a new trustee 
to- administer the intended trust even though the testator has not 
188 54 &: 55 Viet., c .78. 
189 Re Motherwell, [1910] Ir. R. 249 (devise to the Church of Ireland Representa-
tive Body effectuated by a scheme). In the Will of Seadon, 11 Arg. L.R. 511, 27 Aust. 
Law Times 118 (1905). 
MO Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 587 (1815). 
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named a capable trustee.141 If the disposition is one inter vivos, 
the incapacity of the association to take title will leave the legal 
title in the donor. If the court appoints a trustee to take the 
legal title, it is in effect forcing an intending donor to complete 
a gratuitous disposition which courts of equity have been re-
luctant to do. Despite this theoretical difficulty an Illinois court 
has held that a trustee could be appointed in these circumstances 
even though the intended trust was a private one for the benefit 
of an individual.142 A fortiori, the jurisdiction could be exercised 
when the intended trust is one for charitable purposes. In Eng-
land, in a similar situation it might be possible to avoid the the-
oretical difficulty by saying that the existing members acquired 
the legal title as co-owners by force of the conveyance and that 
their unwieldy numbers made it necessary to appoint a new trustee. 
The construction by many courts of dispositions to charitable 
associations as trusts for the purposes of those associations even 
though they appear, at first sight, to be gifts, looked at in con-
junction with the cases which recognize that the property of a 
non-charitable association may be held upon a trust for a non-
charitable purpose may suggest a uniform method of considering 
all dispositions to associations as intended trusts. By so regard-
ing the disposition the equitable jurisdiction to prevent a trust 
failing for want of a trustee would become relevant whenever the 
nature of the property given was such as to require its exercise.143 
This view of the disposition could supply a technique for giv-
ing unincorporated groups a more secure place in the law of 
property. 
141 The cases are collected in 1 Scon, TRUSTS §97, n. 5. 
142 Wittmeier v. Heiligenstein, 308 Ill. 434, 139 N .E. 871 (1923). 
143 For an instance in which a transfer of shares to an association eo nomine was 
treated in a manner similar to that suggested in the text, see Thadeus Kosciuszko Soc. v. 
Polish Home Assn., (Mo. App. 1949) 218 S.W. (2d) 811. 
